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Throughout the 20th Century young men in most Western countries faced the risk
of military conscription. Although compulsory service ended in the U.S. in 1973, the
practice continued until very recently in many European nations, and is still widely used
around the world.1 Spurred in part by recent decisions to end conscription in Sweden,
Italy, France, and Germany, there is renewed interest in understanding the impacts of
mandatory service on a wide range of outcomes, including earnings (Angrist and Chen,
2011; Angrist, Chen, and Song, 2011; Grenet et al., 2011; Paloyo, 2010), education
(Maurin and Xenogiani, 2007; Cipollone and Rosolia, 2007; Keller et al., 2009; Bauer
et al., 2009), health (Bedard and Deschenes, 2006; Dobkin and Shabani, 2009; Autor et
al., 2011), and crime (Galiani et al., 2011).
Revealed preference arguments suggest that conscripts will su⁄er economic losses
from coerced service (e.g., Oi, 1967). Nevertheless, some analysts have argued that
compulsory service can have a positive return for disadvantaged youth who face limited
civilian job opportunities (e.g., Berger and Hirsch, 1983; de Tray, 1982).2 Seminal
research by Angrist (1990) showed that Vietnam-era draftees had lower earnings than
non-draftees, a ￿nding he attributed to the low value of military experience in the
civilian labor market. Subsequent research in the U.S. and other countries, however,
has uncovered a surprisingly mixed pattern of impacts. Imbens and van der Klaauw
(1995) found that 10 years after conscription Dutch veterans earned lower wages than
those who avoided service. In contrast, Albrecht et al. (1999) estimated a positive
earnings premium for Swedish conscripts. Grenet et al. (2011) ￿nd no long-run impact
on the wages of British conscripts; likewise, Bauer et al. (2009) ￿nd no e⁄ect for West
German conscripts.3 In a recent re-analysis of the Vietnam-era draftees, Angrist and
Chen (2011) ￿nd that by age 50 they have about the same earnings as non-draftees, and
slightly higher education.
In this paper we present new evidence on the long-run e⁄ects of mandatory military
service, using detailed longitudinal data for Portuguese men born in the late 1960s.
1In Europe, for example, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Norway, and Switzer-
land all still require men to perform some form of national service. Russia and China also have
mandatory military service.
2Hirsh and Mehay (2003) study wage di⁄erences between reservists who have served in active
duty and those who have not, and ￿nd small average di⁄erences, but a positive impact of service
for African Americans.
3Kunze (2002) analyzes longitudinal data for German workers and ￿nds a complex pattern of
earnings premiums for veterans.
1Some 40% of the men in these cohorts served in the military: a majority entered the
service with less than 6 years of formal schooling. Our analysis relies on a unique annual
census of wages ￿the Quadros de Pessoal (QP) ￿that allows us to track the cohorts of
interest from their initial entry into the labor market until their early forties. Using
the fact that employers were required to treat conscripted employees as being on leave
of absence, we can identify men who were working just prior to the age of conscription
(age 21) and then entered the military, and a comparison group of men who remained
in civilian jobs over the same period.
Implementing a series of di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimators we ￿nd that the average
impact of military service for men who had entered the labor market by age 21 is
positive but insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero throughout the period from 2 to 20 years
after their service. This small average e⁄ect, however, masks a statistically signi￿cant
later-life impact of about 4-5% for men with lower levels of education (under 6 years
of schooling), coupled with a zero-e⁄ect for men with higher education. The positive
impact for the less-educated group mirrors the ￿ndings for U.S. veterans by Berger
and Hirsch (1983) and suggests that mandatory service can be a valuable experience
for disadvantaged men who might otherwise spend their careers in low-level jobs. Our
con￿dence in these results is bolstered by three additional ￿ndings. First, we ￿nd that
wages of the men who eventually served in the military and those who did not track
each other very closely in the period up to age 21. Second, we ￿nd that pre-conscription
wages are a strong predictor of wages 10 to 20 years later, suggesting that any di⁄erences
in average ability between veterans and non-veterans are revealed by their wages in the
period prior to conscription. Third, comparisons of employment rates show that the
veterans converge to the non-veterans within about 6-7 years after the completion of
service, alleviating concerns about possible selection biases.
While our primary focus is on the e⁄ect of conscription for men who were working
prior to age 21, an important concern is that conscription could have had di⁄erent e⁄ects
on other groups ￿e.g., those who never worked prior to age 21. As a check we relate
average wages for men born in di⁄erent years from 1959 to 1969 to cohort-level data on
conscription rates. Consistent with our main ￿ndings, this analysis points to a small
positive average e⁄ect of conscription, and rules out a large negative average e⁄ect across
all the men in a particular cohort.
The next section of the paper provides a brief overview of the institutional back-
ground underlying the conscription process in Portugal in the late 1980s. Section 2
2discusses the QP data set and our method for identifying conscripts, based on unpaid
leave-of-absence status. We then provide a comparison of the conscript and non-conscript
groups, as well as other individuals in the birth cohort under analysis. Section 4 presents
the details of our statistical approach, which takes advantage of the availability of pre-
conscription earnings data to control for potential ability di⁄erences between conscripts
and non-conscripts. Section 5 presents our main ￿ndings, ￿rst using graphical tech-
niques, then using more formal regression models, including models that explore a range
of possible values for the relative e⁄ect of unobserved ability in pre-conscription versus
post-conscription earnings. We also explore possible mechanisms driving the enlistment
e⁄ect. Section 6 presents our inter-cohort comparisons for men born between 1959 and
1969, while section 7 concludes.
1 Military Service in Portugal
During the 1960s and early 1970s Portugal fought colonial wars in Angola, Mozam-
bique, and Guinea-Bissau sta⁄ed by a far-reaching conscription system.4 Following the
overthrow of the Estado Novo regime in 1974 and the withdrawal from Africa, the Por-
tuguese military transitioned to a smaller peacetime force.5 Throughout the 1980s and
early 1990s men were at risk of conscription in the year they turned 21, and draftees
were required to serve for a maximum of 2 years.6 Individuals were called for medical
and psychological evaluations in the year they turned 20. Those judged physically or
mentally un￿t and those convicted of serious felonies were exempted from service. A
tiny fraction of men (some 100 to 300 per year) also met the substantial hurdles to qual-
ify for alternative service as conscientious objectors (Domingues, 1998). Short-term
deferments could be granted to students and individuals who were the sole providers for
their family, but options for self-selecting out of service altogether were quite limited.
Over the 1990s a series of laws reduced the age of conscription to 20 (e⁄ective in
1993 for men born in 1973 or later) and reduced the duration of service to a maximum
of 8 months for the 1970 and 1971 birth cohorts, and to 4 months for those born in 1972
or later. Finally, in 2005, peacetime conscription ended and the Portuguese military
4By the early 1970s some 8% of the Portuguese labor force were in the military (Graham,
1979). A relatively large number of young people ￿over 100,000 per year in 1970, for example
￿left the country illegally to avoid service (Baganha and Marques, 2001, Table 2.10).
5Carrington and de Lima (1996) study the impact of the large number of retornados ￿Por-
tuguese nationals who returned at the end of the colonial wars ￿on labor market conditions in
Portugal.
6Information on the terms of service for men who served in the 1980s and 1990s is taken
directly from legal statutes: see the Appendix for a list of these laws.
3became an all-volunteer force open to both men and women.
Table 1 presents a variety of data on the conscription system facing Portuguese men
born from 1959 to 1979, including the size of each cohort, the age of determination of
conscription status, the number of men drafted in the year the cohort reached the age of
conscription, the fraction of the cohort who were conscripted, and their maximum length
of service. The conscription rate for men born in the 1960s and 1970s ranged from 30 to
50 percent, with a dip for the 1972 and 1973 cohorts who were both subject to the draft
in 1993. Note that unlike the situation in some European countries, peacetime service
in Portugal was far from universal. Instead, the fraction of men who served in a given
cohort was determined by the manpower needs of the military, the duration of service,
and the size of the cohort.
Once in the military, conscripts with the lowest levels of education could undertake
basic skills training while those with higher schooling could undertake occupational train-
ing. Labor laws in Portugal specify that occupational training acquired in the military
is equivalent to civilian training, allowing some conscripts to accumulate transferable
skills.7 Another important piece of legislation required employers to treat drafted men
as "on leave" from their job. This provision may have discouraged ￿rms from hiring
young men until their conscription status was settled, though as we discuss below we
see no evidence of this behavior. For those who were hired and subsequently drafted,
however, it presumably eased the transition back to civilian life. Finally, conscripts in
good standing could re-enlist for up to 8 years of additional service, though re-enlistment
rates were generally quite low.
2 Data on Earnings and Conscription Status
The Quadros de Pessoal
Our analysis relies on a unique administrative data set, the Quadros de Pessoal (QP),
collected annually by the Ministry of Employment. The QP is a census of paid workers
in the Portuguese private sector: all ￿rms with at least one paid worker are legally oblig-
ated to return information on their full roster of employees, including wages and hours
of work during the appropriate reference week (in March until 1993 and in October since
1994).8 Importantly for our purposes, during the 1980s and 1990s the QP asked em-
7Currently, such equivalence is guaranteed for training in such ￿elds as professional driving,
cooking and bakery, and emergency medical support.
8Firms are required to post their employee rosters and the corresponding salary information
in a public place visible by its workers, helping to ensure the accuracy of the reported infor-
4ployers to include men on leave for military duty in their roster. We identify individuals
with missing values for their earnings and hours of work in the reference week as being
"on leave".9 A limitation of the data is that government workers ￿who comprise just
under 20 percent of the Portuguese workforce ￿are excluded from coverage.10 A second
limitation is that the QP provides only a snapshot of labor market outcomes in each
year. Individuals who are unemployed or out of the labor force at the time of the census
have no labor market data for that year. Electronic records from the QP are available
for the period from 1986 to 2009, and include worker and ￿rm identi￿ers that allow
individuals to be tracked over time and across jobs. Worker-level data are unavailable
for 1990 and 2001, creating gaps in the worker histories in those two years.
Information for employees in the QP includes gender, date of birth, current edu-
cational attainment, occupation, date of hire, base earnings, supplemental payments,
and hours of work. Information on the employer side includes industry and location
of the ￿rm, gross annual revenues, and ownership status. We use an edited version
of the data that has been checked for consistency of the longitudinal matches (see the
Data Appendix). We measure a worker￿ s gross hourly wage by dividing the sum of the
individual￿ s monthly base-wage and other regularly-paid bene￿ts by his or her normal
hours of work.11 All wages are de￿ ated using the Consumer Price Index (2009=100).
We treat as missing any wage observation that is below 0.75 of the ￿rst percentile of
wages, or above 3 times the 99th percentile, in the corresponding year. This eliminates
a small fraction (about 1%) of observations that appear to re￿ ect misplaced decimals
and similar gross errors.
Identifying Conscripts
Ideally we could combine information from military records with labor market data from
the QP to study the impacts of service on all veterans, including men with no record
of employment prior to conscription. Unfortunately, individual military service records
mation. During the 1980s there was some under-coverage in the QP, particularly of small ￿rms
(Braguinsky et al., 2011).
9Firms may also fail to report earnings and hours for other reasons, including long-term
illnesses, strikes, and maternity leave ￿see Table A.1 in the Data Appendix. Unfortunately, the
reason for leave status is not available in the electronic version of the QP.
10Also missing from the employee rosters are contract workers. In recent years such workers
have accounted for a growing share of employment (Rebelo, 2003).
11Reported earnings are net of the employer portion of social security taxes, but include the
employee portion of the tax, currently 11 percent. For a fraction of workers the employer￿ s
report of hours appears to depend on the number of days worked in the survey month, which
varies from year to year. All our models include year e⁄ects to control for this variation.
5are not available. Thus, we have to infer conscription status from the observed data in
the QP. We focus on men born before 1970 (when the maximum term of service was
reduced to 8 months), and make use of the fact that employers were instructed to report
workers who had been drafted as on leave. A complication is that some of the conscripts
in a given year could be inducted early in the year, before the March date of the QP,
and others could be inducted after the QP was completed. We therefore identify two
separate groups of conscripts: (1) men who are recorded in the QP as working full time
in March of the year they turned 20 years of age, and are "on leave" (i.e., reported with
missing earnings and hours) in the next two years; (2) men who were working full time
in March of the year they turned 21, and were on leave in March in the next year.12
As a comparison group we use men who were working full time in March of the year
they turned 21 and in March of the following year. These men could not have been
inducted into the military at age 21 and served more than a year. Note that we are
limiting attention to conscripts and non-conscripts who were working just before or just
after reaching the age of 21. This has the important advantage that we have a full-time
wage observation for each person at (approximately) age 21. For conscripts, the wage
is measured just prior to entering the military at age 20 or 21; for non-conscripts, it is
measured in the year they turn 21.
To implement these de￿nitions we need to limit attention to cohorts that reached
the age of 20 in 1986 or later (the ￿rst year QP data are available). Moreover, since the
QP has a gap in 1990, we cannot use data for cohorts born in 1968 or 1969, as their
status in the years they turned 21 or 22 is unknown. Given these constraints, we focus
on men born in 1967 as our primary cohort of interest. These men were 18 or 19 at the
time of the ￿rst available QP survey in March 1986 and can be followed continuously for
three years until the break in the data in 1990 (i.e., until March 1989, when they were
21 or 22 years of age). In particular for this cohort we have at least two years of data
on wages prior to the age at which their conscription status was determined.
Before proceeding further it is important to verify that men born in 1967 who were
working full time at age 20 or 21 and then recorded as on leave were actually conscripted.
While we cannot o⁄er de￿nitive proof, we conducted a series of comparisons summarized
in Figure 1 that we believe are highly supportive of our assumptions. The upper left
12As a robustness check we consider relaxing the criteria for the ￿rst subgroup slightly by
requiring that they were employed full time in March of the year they turned 20 and on leave in
the next March. We show below this has very little e⁄ect on our results.
6hand panel of the ￿gure shows the distribution of activities in each year of age from 18
to 42 for men born in 1967 who were observed working full time at either age 20 or 21.
Notice that the fraction of the cohort reported on leave is relatively high for only two
years ￿ages 21 and 22. Moreover, the total fraction observed working or on leave at
ages 21 and 22 is very similar to the fraction observed working at ages 23 and older.
This pattern strongly suggests that leave of absence status is associated with military
service. By comparison, the upper right hand panel shows similar data for women born
in 1967. For women there is no "unusual" spike in the fraction on leave at ages 21 and
22, con￿rming that the draft is the likely explanation for the high fraction of men on
leave at these ages.
Comparisons with later cohorts of men and women, presented in the middle and
lower panels of the Figure, provide further evidence that most of the men from the 1967
cohort who were on leave at ages 21-22 were in the military. In the middle panels we
show data for people born in 1977 who were observed working full time at age 19 or
20. (We adjust the requirement on age to re￿ ect the fact that conscription occurred at
age 20 for this cohort). Consistent with the very short term of military service for this
cohort (4 months maximum) we see only a relatively small rise in the fraction of men
classi￿ed as on leave at age 20. For women born in 1977 the patterns look very similar
to those of women born 10 years earlier. Finally, in the lower panels of Figure 1 we show
data for men and women born in 1987 who were observed working full time at age 19
or 20. For this cohort there was no mandatory military service, and reassuringly only
a very small fraction of men are recorded as on leave between the ages of 20 and 22.
Again, the data for women look relatively similar to the data for women born 10 or 20
years earlier.
While we believe that military service accounts for the unusual spike in the fraction
of 1967 men on leave at ages 21 and 22, some men would obviously fall into this category
even in the absence of conscription. To estimate the "false positive" rate we tabulated
the fractions of men at di⁄erent ages who were working in the 1988 QP and on leave in
1989. This fraction was 19.0% for 21 year olds, 9% for 22 year olds, 3.0% for 23 year
olds, and between 2.7% and 3.0% for men between the ages of 24 and 30. Comparing 21
year olds to those 23 and older, we infer that about 15% of 21-year-olds were probably
on leave for other reasons. This means that simple comparisons between men identi￿ed
as conscripts and those identi￿ed as non-conscripts will likely understate the magnitude
of the true gap by about 15%.
73 The 1967 Birth Cohort: Conscripts, Non-Conscripts,
and Others
While we can use employment and leave status information to identify a group of men
born in 1967 who were working just before the determination of their conscription status
and served in the military, and a comparison group who did not serve, there are many
others in the cohort whose draft status is uncertain, including men with no record of
employment by age 21. Table 2 presents some comparative information on the various
subgroups to help contextualize our main groups of interest.
Out of the full cohort of approximately 104,000 men born in 1967 (see Table 1),
approximately 90% are observed as private-sector employees in the QP at some point
between 1986 and 2009. Of these, about 5% have some inconsistency in their data (i.e., a
missing or outlier wage observation if employed, or a problem linking records over time).
Deletion of these observations leads to a sample of 86,909 men born in 1967 and ever
observed in the QP with valid data, summarized in column 1 of Table 2. Given the low
schooling attainment of this cohort (mean completed school at age 35 = 7 years) most
of the men were presumably out of school by age 19. Nevertheless only about one-￿fth
were working full time at age 20 or 21 and meet the criteria to be potentially used in
our analysis.13 Despite the relatively low fraction working before age 21, the bottom
rows of the table show that 61% are observed at least once between 2002 and 2009 (at
ages 35-42).
Column 2 shows the characteristics of the entire sample of "early labor market en-
trants" (i.e., those who were working full time at age 20 or 21). Interestingly, the
fraction of this subgroup observed in the QP at least once between 2002 and 2009 is
very similar to the fraction of the entire cohort observed in that interval (62% versus
61%), while the average wages of the early labor market entrants are about 12% lower
than the average wage for the entire cohort. We suspect that most of the di⁄erence
is attributable to the relatively lower schooling of the early labor market entrants. By
2002, their average years of completed schooling was 5.8 years, versus 7.1 years for the
cohort as a whole.
13A concern about the legal requirement that draftees be allowed to return to their job at the
end of their service is that this would discourage employers from hiring men before the age of
21. We conducted a di⁄erence in di⁄erences analysis of employment rates of men and women at
ages 18, 19, and 20 between cohorts born in 1967 and those born in 1987, testing whether the
employment rates of the 1967 cohort of men were unusually low. This shows a small male ￿ 1967
interaction e⁄ect (around -1.5 percentage points) potentially indicating a small discouragement
e⁄ect in the hiring of men when the draft was in e⁄ect.
8Among the early labor market entrants we identify four subgroups: conscripts (col-
umn 4 of Table 2), who were either working full time in March 1987 and on leave the next
two years, or working full time in March 1988 and on leave the next year; non-conscripts
(column 5), who were working full time in both March 1988 and March 1989; people
missing from the QP in 1989 (column 6) who were presumably unemployed, out of the
labor force, or working in the government sector in March 1989; and ￿nally a fourth
residual group (column 7) made up of men with a variety of employment histories in the
period from 1987 to 1989 that do not ￿t into the other 3 groups. Both the missing and
residual groups include a mix of conscripts and non-conscripts. For example, men who
were working full time in March 1988 but subsequently left that job before entering the
military later in the year would appear in the "missing" group.
Comparisons across columns 4-7 show that the 1986-88 wages of the conscripted and
non-conscripted groups are quite similar, while the wages of the group who are missing
from the 1989 QP are a little lower, and those of the residual group are a little higher.
The conscripts have the highest education levels of the four groups of early entrants,
measured either in the ￿rst year they ever appear in the QP, or in 2002. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the military generally preferred men with higher literacy and
numeracy skills, leading to a systematic under-representation of the lowest educated
men in the conscripted group. Nevertheless, conscripts and non-conscripts have nearly
the same probability of appearing in the QP in the period from 2002 to 2009, and fairly
similar hourly wages. Interestingly, the group who were missing from the QP in 1989
have a much lower likelihood of appearing in the data set during 2002-2009, suggesting
strong persistence in their low probability of private-sector employment. The residual
group, by comparison, has about the same likelihood of appearing in the QP in the
2002-2009 period as the conscripts and non-conscripts.
Finally, column 8 of Table 2 shows data for the men who were not working full time
in either 1987 or 1988. Some of these late labor market entrants were attending post-
secondary schooling at age 20-21. Consistent with this fact, the fraction of the group
with a university degree is relatively high (though still only 8%)14, and on average they
have two more years of education than the early labor market entrants. Despite their
late entry to the labor market, by mid-career they are about as likely to appear in
the QP as the early entrants group (61% with a wage observation between 2002 and
2009, versus 62% for early entrants as a whole). By this time they also have about 17%
14A larger share attended college, given that the drop-out rate is approximately 30%.
9higher average wages than the early entrants (mean log wage = 1.71 versus 1.54 for early
entrants), re￿ ecting their nearly 2 additional years of schooling.
In the remainder of the paper we mainly focus on comparisons between early entrants
who can be clearly identi￿ed as conscripts (column 4 of Table 2) and those who can be
clearly identi￿ed as non-conscripts (column 5). In Section 5, however, we present a
series of robustness checks in which we consider relaxing the criteria to be included
in the conscript and non-conscript groups, thereby moving some of the men from the
missing and residual categories into these groups. As we show, plausible changes in the
de￿nitions of the two groups have little impact on our main results. In section 6 we
use cohort-wide comparisons of wages and conscription rates for men born from 1959
to 1969 to assess the magnitude of the conscription e⁄ect estimated for the subgroup of
early labor market entrants in 1967.
4 Measuring the Causal E⁄ect of Conscription on Subse-
quent Earnings
Given the non-random nature of the conscription process facing men born in the 1960s
in Portugal, a fundamental concern for our analysis is that unobserved di⁄erences be-
tween veterans and non-veterans will confound our estimate of the e⁄ect of military
service. Anecdotal evidence, for example, suggests that many men were exempted from
service for health-related reasons that might also a⁄ect their future wages.15 Since our
primary focus in on men who were working full time just prior to determination of their
conscription status, we use pre-conscription wages to control for ability di⁄erences be-
tween veterans and non-veterans. Our approach is essentially a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
framework, generalized to allow the return to unobserved ability to increase with age.
To proceed more formally, let S denote the level of schooling of a given individual
at the date just before the conscription decision is made. (For notational simplicity we
treat S as a number: in our empirical analysis, however, we measure education with a
set of dummies). We assume that S is a function of a general measure of ability a and
a random error component u1 :
S = f(a) + u1;
where f() is a possibly nonlinear function. Let w0 represent the logarithm of the hourly
wage that is earned by the individual just prior to the determination of conscription
15Tartter (1993) reports that in 1989 one quarter of potential conscripts were deemed physically
un￿t for service.
10status. We assume that this wage depends on ability, schooling, and an additive error
component ￿0 that is uncorrelated with schooling:
w0 = a + ￿0S + ￿0: (1)
Note that we have scaled the ability measure by assuming that expected log wages in
period 0 vary 1 for 1 with a (holding constant schooling). Assume that the probability
of being conscripted into the military (indicated by the binary variable V ) is a general
function of ability and schooling, but does not depend on the transitory error ￿0 :
pr(V = 1) = h(a;S):
Finally, assume the wage in post-service period t = 1;:::T depends on an additive func-
tion of ability, schooling, enlistment status, and an error component ￿t:
wt =  ta + ￿tS + ￿tV + ￿t; (2)
where  t > 0 is a loading factor that can vary over time, ￿t represents the causal e⁄ect of
military service on wages in period t, and the error term ￿t is assumed to be uncorrelated
with ability, schooling, or veteran status (though ￿t may be correlated with ￿t￿j).
If conscription status is correlated with ability, OLS estimation of equation (2) will
lead to a biased estimate of the causal e⁄ect ￿t. When  t = 1 this correlation can be
eliminated by comparing the growth rates of wages of veterans and non-veterans, leading
to a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences speci￿cation:
wt ￿ w0 = (￿t ￿ ￿0)S + ￿tV + ￿t ￿ ￿0:
Though the assumption that unobserved ability has a constant e⁄ect on wages is a
natural starting point, a number of studies have found that the return to ability rises with
experience as market participants learn about the true abilities of di⁄erent individuals.16
Schoenberg (2007, Table 5), for example, shows that the e⁄ect of measured AFQT scores
on wages of men in the NLSY roughly doubles during their ￿rst decade in the labor
market, suggesting a value of  t ￿ 2 for t = 10.17
16See for example Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001). The same point
has arisen in studies that attempt to use income measured at a certain point as a proxy for
permanent income ￿see Haider and Solon (2006).
17Similar analyses have also been conducted using the same data set by Lange (2007), and
Arcidiacono et al. (2008). All these studies show a rise in the return to AFQT in the ￿rst 10
years in the labor market, particularly for men without a college education.
11To illustrate the more general case ( t 6= 1), we follow Chamberlain (1982) and
consider the linear projection of unobserved ability on schooling and veteran status:
a = ￿sS + ￿vV + ￿
where E[￿S] = E[￿V ] = 0: Substituting this equation into (1) and (2) yields the reduced
form system:
w0 = (￿s + ￿0)S + ￿vV + ￿ + ￿0 (3)
= bS0S + bV 0V + v0
wt = ( t￿s + ￿t)S + ( t￿v + ￿t)V +  t￿ + ￿t (4)
= bStS + bV tV + vt
The reduced form e⁄ect of veteran status on pre-conscription wages (bV 0) provides an
estimate of the ability gap between conscripts and non-conscripts, ￿v. The reduced-form
e⁄ect in any later period, (bV t); includes the true causal e⁄ect ￿t and a bias term that
depends on the ability gap (measured in period 0 units) and the return to ability in
period t. Given estimates of bV 0 and bV t, and a value for the relative factor loading  t,
an unbiased estimate of the causal e⁄ect of veteran status in period t is:
b ￿t = b bV t ￿  b bV 0: (5)
In a "balanced" sample with no missing wage data an identical estimate can be obtained
by forming a quasi-di⁄erence in wages between period t and period 0 and regressing the
outcome on schooling and veteran status:
wt ￿  tw0 = (￿t ￿  t￿0)S + ￿tV + ￿t ￿  t￿0:
Note that when b bV 0 = 0 there is no measured ability di⁄erence between veterans and
non-veterans, and di⁄erent choices for the quasi-di⁄erencing factor  t will yield the same
estimate of b ￿t.18 In the analysis below we show that estimates of b bV 0 for men who were
working full time prior to the age of conscription are uniformly small and statistically
insigni￿cant, suggesting that the ability di⁄erences are negligible.
Despite the relatively small estimates of b bV 0 in our sample, when   is large in mag-
nitude the bias correction implied by equation (5) can be sizeable. It is therefore
18In the case where b bV 0 = 0 di⁄erent choices for   will lead to identical estimates for ￿t but
the sampling error will vary with the choice of  :Assuming b bV 0 = 0 the most e¢ cient choice for
  is the estimated coe¢ cient of w0 from an OLS regression of wt on S, V; and w0:
12interesting to ask what value of   is appropriate for our setting. Unfortunately, with-
out additional restrictions the set of factor loadings, returns to schooling, and returns
to veteran status f t;￿t;￿tg are not identi￿able from the 2(T +1) reduced-form regres-
sion coe¢ cients in equations (3) and (4). One potential set of identifying assumptions
is that the returns to schooling and veteran status are both constant over time (i.e.,
￿t = ￿0 = ￿ and ￿t = ￿): In this case, if there are at least two post-conscription
periods with di⁄erent  0
ts (both not equal to 1); it is possible to obtain estimates of the
loading factors and the veteran e⁄ect ￿ using the relative changes in the reduced form
e⁄ects of schooling and veteran status between periods. In the Portuguese context there
is considerable evidence that the return to education has risen over the past two decades
(e.g., Centeno and Novo, 2009). Moreover, existing research suggests that the premium
for veteran service may change with age or experience (e.g., Angrist, 1990 and Angrist
and Chen, 2011). Thus, we do not pursue this identi￿cation strategy here.
An alternative identi￿cation strategy uses the second moments of the reduced form
errors in equations (3) and (4):
vt =  t￿ + ￿t t = 0;1;:::T
with  0 = 1 (see Lemieux, 1998). This "one factor" model implies a highly restrictive
covariance structure:
var[vt] = ( t)2var[￿] + var[￿t]
cov[vt;vs] =  t svar[￿] + cov[￿t;￿s]:
Given a data generating process for the transitory shocks ￿t and a parametric shape for
the time path of the loading factors, the key parameters  t can be estimated by minimum
distance methods from the observed covariances of the reduced form wage residuals b vt
(t = 0;1::::T). In the Appendix we describe how we apply this procedure to obtain
estimates of the  0
ts for the men in our sample of veterans and nonveterans who were
working at age 20/21. In brief, we assume that the transitory shocks ￿t are generated
by a stationary ￿rst-order autogressive process, with an arbitrary initial condition. We
also assume that  t rises linearly for t years, and then stabilizes:
 t = 1 + gt 0 ￿ t ￿ t
=   = 1 + gt t > t:
This path is roughly consistent with the path implied by standard learning models (e.g.,
13Farber and Gibbons, 1996), assuming that learning is completed after t years.19 Some
experimentation revealed that a value of t equal to 14 years yields the best ￿t to the
data, and leads to a value of   = 2:62 (standard error = 0:16), which is comparable
to the estimate obtained by Schoenberg (2007) for the rise in returns to AFQT. The
estimated variance components imply that 78% of the variance in pre-conscription wages
is attributable to the transitory shock, and that the transitory wage shocks have a ￿rst-
order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0:72.
Although models like (1) and (2) are widely used in the program evaluation literature,
there are a number of concerns with a simple di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences framework for
measuring the e⁄ect of conscription in Portugal. One is that veteran status may be
correlated with both the permanent component of ability and the transitory error in
pre-conscription earnings. In this case, veterans and non-veterans with similar per-
conscription wages would not be expected to follow the same wage trajectory in the
absence of a true service e⁄ect. One way to test whether veteran status is independent of
the transitory wage component is to examine a longer series of pre-conscription earnings,
and look for a "dip" or "surge" in wages just prior to conscription (e.g., Ashenfelter,
1978, Ashenfelter and Card, 1985). As we show below, wages of the conscipts and non-
conscripts follow very similar trends in the three years prior to conscription, providing
no evidence that men with temporarily low (or high) wages were more likely to be
conscripted.
A second concern is that wages of young workers in Portugal may be relatively unin-
formative about long run ability di⁄erences because of institutional forces that compress
wage di⁄erentials at the low end of the wage distribution ￿speci￿cally, mandatory cov-
erage by sectoral bargaining contracts, and a high minimum wage (see for example,
Cardoso, 1998; Cardoso and Portugal 2005; Centeno and Novo, 2009). Despite these
institutional forces, wages at age 20/21 are highly predictive of wages later in life for the
men in our sample. This fact is illustrated in Figure 2, where we plot mean log wages in
2002-2009 against mean log wages at age 20-21 for the men in 100 "percentile groups",
classi￿ed by the value of their pre-conscription wages. (We use the combined sample of
6,749 conscripts and non-conscripts described in column 3 of Table 2 to construct the
￿gure). Two features are notable in this graph. The ￿rst is that hourly wages at age
20/21 are relatively disperse. In particular, less than 2% of workers earn the hourly
19Altonji and Pierret (2001) and Schoenberg (2007) consider models in which the return to
AFQT is allowed to rise linearly with experience, and also consider quadratic models.
14equivalent of the national minimum wage at age 20/21, and there are no other large
"spikes" in the distribution, so intial wages for all 100 percentile groups are distinct.20
A second observation is that the relationship between wages at 20/21 and average wages
in mid-career is quite strong. The correlation across percentile groups is 0.87, implying
that three-quarters of the variation in average wages at ages 35-42 for groups of size
n ￿ 67 can be predicted from average wages at age 20/21.21
5 The E⁄ect of Conscription on Subsequent Wages
Graphical Overview
To set the stage for our main results it is helpful to begin with a graphical overview
of the wage and employment outcomes of early labor market entrants who were either
conscripted or not conscripted. Figure 3a plots the wage pro￿les for the two groups.
In this graph, and in our subsequent regression models, we classify observations by the
calendar year of observation in the QP, and report mean log wages for all observations
with a wage in that year. Note that the absence of data for 1990 and 2001 creates
"holes" in the pro￿les in these years. Taking account of these gaps we have up to three
years of pre-conscription wage data (in 1986, 1987, and 1988)22 and up to 18 years of
post-conscription data (for 1991 to 2009).
Examination of the wage series in Figure 3a shows that the pre-conscription wage
pro￿les are very similar for the two groups, with a small positive wage advantage for
conscripts in each year. In particular the wage pro￿les are virtually parallel and show
no evidence of a pre-treatment dip or surge for conscripts relative to those who were
not conscripted. This pattern is consistent with the assumption that selection into
the military was driven by the permanent characteristics of workers, rather than the
transitory wage outcome at age 20 or 21. In 1991, the ￿rst year of the post-service period,
the two groups again have very similar wages. Thereafter, wages of the conscripts are
uniformly above those of the non-conscripts, with a 1-3 percentage point gap between
20Minimum wage legislation in Portugal speci￿es a minimum for monthly earnings: about 7%
of the sample are recorded as earning the minimum monthly earnings for 1988. However, there
is some variation in hours per month (corresponding to 8, 8.5, or 9 hours per day, for example),
which smooths out the mass at the minimum of monthly earnings.
21As discussed in the Appendix, the slope of the relationship in Figure 2 between average
wages at ages 35-42 and pre-conscription wages (which is 0.53) is nearly identical to the slope
predicted by the simple model we use to obtain an estimate of the loading factors  t at di⁄erent
ages, providing a validation test for that model.
22Recall that conscripts are men who worked in 1987 and were on leave in 1988 and 1989, or
worked in 1988 and were on leave in 1989. We only have a 1988 wage observation for those in
the latter category.
151992 and 2000 (ages 27-33) and a relatively steady 3-point gap between 2002 and 2009
(ages 34 to 42).
Figures 3b and 3c present the corresponding wage pro￿les for two subgroups: "low
education" men with no more than 4 years of schooling at age 20/21 (23% of whom
are veterans); and "high education" group with 6 or more years of schooling (31% of
whom are veterans). For both education groups the pre-conscription wage pro￿les
of veterans and non-veterans are very similar, with less than a 1% wage gap between
them in any year. In the immediate post-service years the low-educated veterans have
very similar wages to their non-veteran counterparts. By 2002, however, the veterans
have systematically higher wages, with a gap of about 5% at the end of our sample
period. Among the high-educated group veterans and non-veterans have very similar
wages throughout the period from 1991 to 2000 (ages 23-33) and only very slightly higher
average wages in the last years of our sample.
A potential issue with the wage comparisons in Figures 3a-3c is that the fractions of
conscripts and non-conscripts who are observed with a wage may be di⁄erent at a given
age, leading to potential selectivity biases in the observed wage gaps. Figures 4a-4c plot
the age pro￿les of the probability of appearing as a wage-earner in the QP. All three
graphs show that the conscript group had somewhat higher employment rates than the
non-conscripts in the two earliest years (1986 and 1987). The situation is reversed in
1988 and 1989, however, since by construction the men we classify as non-veterans were
working in 1988 and 1989, whereas the men we classify as veterans were all on leave in
1989 (20% were also on leave in 1988).
In the years immediately following their military service the conscripts as a whole
have slightly lower employment rates than the non-conscripts (e.g., a gap of -3.6 percent-
age points in 1991, and a gap of -1.9 points in 1997). After 2002 the gaps are uniformly
small (under 1 percentage point in magnitude). For the less-educated subgroup (Fig-
ure 4b) the employment gaps vary a little more over time, but are never larger than 3
percentage points in absolute value. For the more-educated subgroup (Figure 4c) the
employment gaps are a little larger between 1991 and 1999, but are very small after 2001.
These patterns suggest that wage comparisons between conscripts and non-conscripts
under the age of 30 have to be interpreted cautiously, since the conscript group has a
somewhat lower employment rate in this age range, potentially inducing a selectivity
bias. After age 35, however, there is less concern about selectivity.
In the Appendix we present an extended series of graphical comparisons that sup-
16plement the ￿ndings in Figures 3 and 4. First, we show the age pro￿les of wages and
employment for women born in 1967 who meet the same criteria as our conscript and
non-conscript groups. Female "conscripts" are presumably women who took maternity
leave at ages 21 and/or 22, while "non-conscripts" are women who worked continuously
at those ages. Consistent with other evidence on the costs of child-bearing (e.g., Light
and Ureta, 1995), we ￿nd that women who take leave at a young age tend to have lower
wages later in their careers than those who did not. The gap is particularly pronounced
for higher-educated women, as might be expected if career interruptions have a higher
cost for them. Employment rates of women who took leave in their early 20￿ s are also
lower than the rates for those who did not. The negative impacts of leave-taking for
young women contrast with the generally positive wage e⁄ects (and 0 employment ef-
fects) for men, and con￿rms that there is not a simple mechanical explanation for the
male e⁄ects.
We also present graphs showing the wage and employment outcomes for all four
groups of early labor market entrants de￿ned in Table 2 (i.e., our two main groups of
conscripts and non-conscripts, plus men who were missing from the QP at age 22, and
the residual group). Generally speaking, the wages of all four groups are fairly similar,
though the residual group tends to have slightly lower wages than the other three. The
employment rates of the groups vary more - in particular, as noted in the discussion of
Table 2, the group who were not in the QP in 1989 have substantially lower employment
rates at all ages than those who were recorded as unpaid leave in that year. We interpret
this as supporting the logic of our classi￿cation scheme, which treats being "on leave"
as fundamentally di⁄erent from being absent altogether from the survey.
Regression Models
In this section we present our main estimation results for models of the e⁄ect of conscrip-
tion on post-conscription earnings. We begin in Table 3 with results for the wage on the
job held immediately prior to conscription (i.e., the wage w0, measured at age 20 or 21).
The model in column (1) is ￿t to our entire sample of conscripts and non-conscripts,
and shows a small positive wage gap between conscripts and non-conscripts, consistent
with the results in Figure 3a. The model in column (2) adds a set of dummies for ed-
ucation (measured at age 20/21). Since conscripts are somewhat better educated than
non-conscripts, and better-educated workers tend to earn more, the addition of these
controls leads to a small negative estimate of the pre-conscription wage gap. Columns 3-
176 show parallel sets of models for men with lower education at age 20/21, and those with
higher education. In both subgroups conscripts have lower wages than non-conscripts,
though the gaps after controlling for education are small and statistically insigni￿cant.23
Based on the evidence in Figures 3a-3c and the regression results in Table 3, we
conclude that the pre-conscription wages for conscripts and non-conscripts who were
working full time at age 20/21 are very similar. As discussed above, in this situation
alternative values for the parameter  t in equation (5) or (6) will yield similar estimates
of the e⁄ect of conscription on subsequent wages, though with larger values of  t the
adjustment for the pre-conscription wage gap can be 2-3 times as large as the initial wage
gap. Our approach is to summarize the results using a range of values of  t from 0 to
our estimate of   = 2:62: Of particular interest is the case of  t = 1, which corresponds
to a conventional di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimate. Another useful benchmark is the
value of  t that arises from an OLS regression of wt on the pre-conscription wage w0
(controlling for initial schooling).24
Table 4 summarizes the estimated veteran e⁄ects associated with the various choices
for the quasi-di⁄erencing factor  t: Given the relative stability of the wage gaps at
di⁄erent ages in Figures 3a-3c, we simplify the presentation by focusing on pooled models
that combine wages in two sub-periods: the years from 1991 to 2000, which represents
the ￿rst decade after completion of military service by the conscripts; and the years from
2002 to 2009, which represents the "mid-career" period for men born in 1967. More
detailed year-by-year results are reported in the Appendix.
The ￿rst panel of Table 4 shows results for the overall sample. For the 1991-2000
period, the estimation results show a small e⁄ect that is within a standard error of 0
for all values of the quasi-di⁄erencing factor. For the later period the average e⁄ect
is 2:1% with no control for pre-enlistment wages, 2:1% when the pre-enlistment wage
is entered freely in the regression model (its estimated coe¢ cient is 0:36), 2:0% when
wages in all periods are di⁄erenced from the pre-enlistment wage, and 1:9% when we
quasi-di⁄erence using a factor of 2:62. The stability of the estimates across di⁄erent
23We have also ￿t models that include a dummy indicating whether the pre-conscription wage
is measured in 1988 (versus 1987). For the overall sample this variable has a coe¢ cient of 0.044
suggesting that wages were about 4% higher if measured in 1988. The addition of this variable
leads to an estimated conscription dummy of 0.47% (standard error = 0.71). In the robustness
section below we discuss results where we in￿ ate pre-conscription wages by 4.4% if measured in
1987.
24Assuming that the pre-conscription wages of veterans and non-veterans are equal, a model
with pre-conscription wages as a control variable will yield the most e¢ cient estimate of the
veteran e⁄ect (i.e., the estimate with the smallest standard error).
18values of the di⁄erencing factor is illustrated in Figure 5a, where we plot the estimated
enlistment e⁄ect for 2002-2009 against various values for the quasi-di⁄erencing factor,
ranging from 0 to 3, as well as the pointwise 95% con￿dence intervals. Though the
estimates from higher values of the quasi-di⁄erencing factor are relatively imprecise, the
point estimates are essentially invariant to the value of the quasi-di⁄erencing factor,
re￿ ecting the very small gap in pre-conscription wages between conscripts and non-
conscripts who are observed with at least one wage in the 2002-2009 period.
The middle and lower panels of Table 4 report a parallel series of models estimated for
the subsets of men with lower or higher levels of education just prior to enlistment. As
suggested by the wage pro￿les in Figure 3b, the average veteran e⁄ect for less educated
men in the ￿rst decade after service is very close to zero. In the 2002-2009 period,
however, the e⁄ect is around 4%, and is statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels for
the models with  t ￿ 1. For the more educated subgroup the wage e⁄ects of conscription
are never large or signi￿cant, and the estimates for 2002-2009 are very close to 0. The
patterns of the estimated veteran e⁄ects on mid-career wages for di⁄erent values of the
quasi-di⁄erencing factor are summarized in Figures 5b and 5c. As in the overall sample,
the estimated wage e⁄ects are quite robust, re￿ ecting the fact that enlistment status is
nearly uncorrelated with pre-enlistment wages.
Assuming that pre-conscription wages are orthogonal to enlistment status, the deci-
sion of which particular value of  t to use in the estimation of post-conscription treat-
ment e⁄ects can be based on e¢ ciency considerations. Under orthogonality between
ability and enlistment status, a simple OLS regression on schooling, initial wages, and
enlistment status provides the least-variance estimates. We therefore focus on this spec-
i￿cation ￿i.e., the estimates presented in column 3 of Table 4 ￿as the basis for our
"preferred" estimates.
Robustness Checks
Our analysis so far has focused on comparisons between two subgroups of men who we
can easily classify as either conscripts or non-conscripts. In this section we consider the
robustness of our conclusions to changes in the way that we de￿ne these two groups. The
results are summarized in Table 5, where we show estimates of the pooled enlistment
e⁄ect for ages 35-42 from speci￿cations with di⁄erent quasi-di⁄erencing factors, using
alternative de￿nitions of the conscripted and non-conscripted groups. We show results
for the overall sample in panel (a); results for the low-education subgroup in panel (b);
19and results for the high-education subgroup in panel (c).
Focusing ￿rst on the results in panel (a), the ￿rst row shows the results from our
"baseline" sample de￿nition (these are taken from the top panel of Table 4). In row 2 we
relax our de￿nition of "early entrants" ￿which is based on full time work at age 20 or
21 in our baseline samples ￿to include part time workers.25 This expands the sample by
about 15%, and leads to estimates that are slightly higher than our baseline estimates
across the range of values for  t:
Our basic conscript de￿nition includes two groups of men: those who were working
full time in March 1987 and on leave in the next two years; and those who were working
full time in March 1988 and on leave in the next year. Arguably, the requirement that
the ￿rst group be on leave in both 1988 and 1989 may be too strict, since some men may
have been inducted in the early months of 1988 and served only a year in the military. In
row 3 we expand the de￿nition of conscripts to include men who were working full time
in March 1987, on leave the next year, and observed in any status in March 1989. This
increases the conscript group by about 40%, and has little impact on the estimates with
no control for the pre-conscription wage (columns 1-2) or with the pre-conscription wage
included as a regressor (columns 3-4). However, in the di⁄erenced speci￿cation (columns
5-6) the alternative sample yields a somewhat larger estimate than the baseline sample
(3.8% versus 2.0%), and in the quasi-di⁄erenced speci￿cation with  t = 2:62, it yields
a relatively large positive estimate (6.6%). This is attributable to the fact that the
pre-conscription wages of the added conscripts (i.e., those who were working full time
in March 1987, on leave in March 1988, and not on leave in March 1989) are slightly
lower than those of other groups, and when 2:62w0 is subtracted from wages observed
at later ages they appear to have a signi￿cant wage advantage. We interpret the large
point estimate arising from the quasi-di⁄erenced model when this group is included as
an "upper bound" on the likely e⁄ect of conscription on the overall sample of men.
In row 4 we consider narrowing the conscript group from our baseline by imposing
the extra requirement that men who were working full time in March 1988 and on leave
in March 1989 also were working full time in March 1987. This reduces the size of
the conscript group by about 25% and leads to estimates that are slightly larger in the
speci￿cations that ignore the initial wage or include it as a control, but slightly smaller
25Thus, non-conscripts are de￿ned as men who were observed working (with a valid wage) in
1988 and 1989, and conscripts are de￿ned as men who either were working in March 1987 and
on leave in March 1988 and 1989, or working in March 1988 and on leave in March 1989.
20in the speci￿cations with  t = 1 or  t = 2:62:
Finally, in row 5 we address a potential non-comparability between the way we
measure pre-conscription wages for men who served in the military and men who did
not. Recall that for non-veterans we use the wage in 1988 as our measure of w0. For
the 80% of conscripts who were working in 1988 and on leave in 1989 we do the same.
But for the other 20%, who were working in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989, we
use the wage in 1987 as the measure of w0: This may lead to some understatement
of pre-conscription wage for the veterans. As a check, we in￿ ated 1987 wages for the
relevant subgroup by 4:4% (the estimate that comes out of a model for pre-conscription
wages that controls for schooling and whether the wage was measured in 1987 or 1988).
Applying the adjustment leads to a slightly smaller estimate of the e⁄ect of veteran
status on wages at mid-career across the various speci￿cations.
Inspection the results in panels (b) and (c) shows that departures from our baseline
sample de￿nition lead to estimated veteran e⁄ects for men with lower or higher education
that are generally quite similar to our baseline estimates. In particular, for the low
education group the range of estimated veteran e⁄ects is from 2:2% to 10%, with most
of the estimates clustered in the range from 4% to 6%: For the high-education group,
by comparison, the estimates range from ￿2:2% to 3:7%, with most of the estimates
clustered around 0.
Overall we interpret the robustness checks as providing general support for the con-
clusions derived from our baseline sample. A caveat is that our use of pre-enlistment
wages to control for unobserved ability di⁄erences between conscripts and non-conscripts
is relatively sensitive to the size of the pre-enlistment wage gap ￿particularly when this
gap is multiplied by a large value of  t: Empirically the pre-conscription wage gaps are
all relatively small. If one takes these gaps as indicative that the true ability gap between
conscripts and non-conscripts is 0, then the most reliable estimates of the veteran e⁄ect
emerge from models that use the pre-conscription wage as a control variable. These
models yield quite stable and relatively precise estimates of the veteran e⁄ect, with
a value of 4-5% for low-education conscripts and approximately 0 for high-education
conscripts.
Mechanisms
The estimates in Table 4 show a signi￿cant but modestly-sized e⁄ect of conscription on
the mid-career wages of low-educated men, coupled with a zero e⁄ect on higher-educated
21men. In this section we brie￿ y discuss some of the possible channels for the conscription
e⁄ect, including education, labor market experience, and location.
The models in Table 6 explore the potential role of education. Speci￿cally, these
models test whether military service had any e⁄ect on the rate of acquisition of additional
schooling between age 20 and 40. The sample includes conscripts and non-conscripts
who are observed working at least once between 2002 and 2009: we measure the change
in education from age 20/21 to the last available year in this period.26 On average
the early labor market entrants in our sample gained 0.77 years of education over their
twenties and thirties. As shown in column (1) of Table 5 the average gain is only slightly
larger for the conscripts (+0.07 years, standard error = 0.05). As might be expected,
however, the gains di⁄er for men with di⁄ering levels of initial education, and since the
conscripted group under-represents both very low educated men, and those with the
most education, it is important to control for initial education in measuring the e⁄ect of
conscription. Adding these controls (column 2) leads to small but signi￿cantly positive
enlistment e⁄ect (+0.14 years, t=2.64).
The remaining columns of Table 6 show parallel models for the subgroups with less
than 6 years of initial schooling and 6 or more years of initial education. In the low-
education subgroup enlistees gain about 1
4 of a year more schooling than non-enlistees,
while in the high-education subgroup there is no e⁄ect of enlistment. Assuming a return
to education of about 8% in the Portuguese market in the 2000￿ s (which is the range
that arises from a standard human capital earnings function) this extra schooling would
generate roughly 2 percentage points higher wages for low-education veterans: enough
to account for about half of the wage advantage we estimate in Table 4b for these men.
We conducted a similar analysis of cumulative labor market experience. As might
be expected given the very similar probabilities of employment of conscripts and non-
conscripts documented in Figures 4a-4c, however, cumulative labor market experience
of veterans and non-veterans increases at nearly the same rate for the two groups. Thus,
experience e⁄ects appear to play almost no role in the emergence of a wage gap for
veterans by mid-career.
Another possible channel for the wage e⁄ect of military service is through geographic
location. About one-third of the Portuguese labor force works in the Lisbon area, and
wages are on average about 16% higher there. We conjectured that the experience of
26Among men observed at least once in 2002-2009, 75% are last observed in 2009 and 90% are
observed in 2006 or later.
22serving in the military could have some e⁄ect on the willingness of men from small
towns and rural areas to migrate to Lisbon. Empirically, however, there is no evidence
of di⁄erential migration behavior, so this channel cannot explain the veteran e⁄ect.
We also conducted an informal "accounting exercise" in which we compared the mea-
sured veteran e⁄ect from a model with no additional controls, and models with controls
for industry and occupation. This exercise is similar to the "Oaxaca decomposition"
technique that is widely used to help understand gender and race-related wage gaps
(see Fortin, Lemieux, Firpo, 2011 for a recent discussion). We ￿nd that di⁄erences in
industry account for very little of the measured veteran e⁄ect for low-education men,
while di⁄erences in occupation can account for about one-half of the e⁄ect. The rel-
atively higher fraction of veterans in higher-wage occupations could be due in part to
their relative gains in schooling, and also other forms of vocational training that are not
recorded in the QP data.
6 Inter-cohort Comparisons
A limitation of the estimates presented in Tables 4 and 5 is they pertain to a relatively
narrow subset of men who were working by age 20 or 21. As a check on the potential
generalizeability of these results to the broader population, this section brie￿ y discusses
an alternative evaluation design that uses inter-cohort comparisons in the conscription
rate.
As noted in Table 1, the fraction of men who were conscripted varies by cohort,
with a range from 30 to 45 percent among cohorts who served for up to two years in
the military. Assuming that conscription rates are uncorrelated with other factors that
in￿ uence the long-run earnings of men in a given cohort, and that conscription has
a homogeneous e⁄ect, one could estimate the e⁄ect from a simple regression of mean
wages for the men in a cohort (observed at some range of ages) on the fraction of the
cohort who were conscripted. A problem for this approach is that di⁄erent cohorts
are never observed at the same age in the same year. Thus, some assumptions are
needed to separately identify cohort, age, and time e⁄ects. We assume that the e⁄ects
of age on wages can be captured by a (time-varying) smooth polynomial, and ￿t models
for log wages that include year e⁄ects, a cubic in age (fully interacted with year) and
unrestricted cohort e⁄ects:
wict = a0t + a1t(t ￿ c) + a2t(t ￿ c)2 + a3t(t ￿ c)3 + !c + eict; (6)
23where wict is the log wage of individual i born in year c and observed in year t;
{a0t;a1t;a2t;a3tg are the coe¢ cients of time-period-speci￿c cubics in age, and !c are
cohort ￿xed e⁄ects. We then relate the cohort e⁄ects to the fraction of the cohort who
served in the military (Vc) :
!c = ￿ + ￿Vc + ec: (7)
We use wage data for the period from 2002-2009 for men born from 1955 to 1975, but ￿t
the second stage model to the narrower set of cohorts born from 1959 to 1969. These
cohorts served in the military from 1980 to 1990 under relatively stable conditions, and
were all subject to a maximum limit of two years of service. The advantage of ￿tting
the ￿rst step model to the broader set of cohorts is that it provides a wider age range
over which to estimate the age polynomials. To get correct standard errors for the
estimate of ￿ we actually ￿t a one-step model that combines equations (6) and (7) and
clusters the standard errors by birth year.27
Figure 6 shows the estimated cohort dummies obtained from equation (6), along with
the fraction of the cohort who served in the military. Inspection of the graph suggests
that cohort average wages and the fraction of conscripts are not very strongly related,
though the overall correlation is weakly positive. The one-step estimate of ￿ is 4.5%,
with a standard error of 5%, providing a relatively wide 95% con￿dence interval for the
cohort-wide conscription e⁄ect that ranges from ￿5:5% to +9:5%. Our conclusion is
that the aggregate evidence is consistent with our main estimates for men who were
working prior to the age of conscription. Moreover, we can de￿nitely rule out large
negative e⁄ects of mandatory military service for the cohort as a whole.
7 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we use detailed administrative data covering the entire private sector of the
Portuguese economy to study the long-term e⁄ects of peace-time military service on men
born in 1967 who were working prior to age 21, when they were subject to mandatory
conscription. We present a series of di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimators that use pre-
conscription wages to control for unobserved ability di⁄erences between veterans and
non-veterans. Wages of veterans and non-veterans track each other very closely in the
years before conscription, and mean wages of the two groups at the job held just before
27We ￿t a version of equation (6) that includes unrestricted cohort dummies for the oldest
cohorts (born 1955-58) and youngest cohorts (born 1970-75) and the fraction of conscripts for
the cohorts born from 1959 to 1969.
24the determination of conscription status are very similar (conditional on schooling),
suggesting that the two groups have very similar unobserved abilities. As a result,
our estimates of the long-run wage impacts of conscription are robust to alternative
assumptions about the evolution of ability-related wage di⁄erences over the career.
We ￿nd a small positive, but statistically insigni￿cant impact of military service on
wages at mid-career (ages 35-42). This is similar to recent ￿ndings on the e⁄ects of peace-
time conscription in Britain (Grenet et al., 2011) and West Germany (Bauer et al., 2009),
and also to recent estimates of the e⁄ect of military service on Vietnam era draftees at
age 40 (Angrist, Chen and Song, 2011). The small average e⁄ect, however, represents an
average of a larger positive e⁄ect for men with only a primary education (about one-half
of the early labor market entrants in the cohort) and a zero e⁄ect for better-educated
men. The positive impact on the low-educated subgroup is partially explained by the
fact that enlistees with initially low education acquire more education than non-enlistees.
They also work in somewhat better-paying industries and occupations. We conjecture
that the higher schooling and occupational outcomes may be due to basic skills and
occupational training received in the military, though we have no direct data on the
extent of this training. Low-educated veterans have, if anything, slightly higher long-run
probabilities of private sector employment than non-veterans, providing no indication of
the elevated criminal propensities found by Galiani et al. (2011) for Argentine veterans.
Several features of the institutional setting may have contributed to the positive
impact of service for less-educated men in our sample. First, these men had at most
4 years of schooling when they entered the military. A year of basic skills training
could have a potentially important impact on such men ￿ allowing some to achieve
literacy, for example. Second, Portuguese law required ￿rms to rehire draftees at the
completion of their service. This may have eased the transition back to civilian life for
the conscripts in our analysis, who all held full time jobs just before entering the military.
Third, it is important to emphasize that the military service we study occurred during
peacetime. Nevertheless, our ￿ndings are consistent with a stream of U.S. ￿ndings,
including de Tray (1982), Berger and Hirsch (1983), Angrist (1998), and Hirsch and
Mehay (2003) which suggest that military service can have a positive wage impact for
relatively disadvantaged men, perhaps comparable in magnitude to the impact of other
labor market training programs.
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28Table 1: C      S   , A      C           , C            R   ,     M       L         S      
Number Age of Number of Men Maximum
of Men in Cohort Conscrip on Conscripted Percent of Men Length of
Year of (1000's) for Cohort (1000's) Conscripted Service (mo.)
Birth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1959 109.7 21 35.5 32.4 24
1960 110.5 21 33.1 30.0 24
1961 111.9 21 30.7 27.5 24
1962 113.8 21 34.2 30.0 24
1963 109.5 21 39.1 35.7 24
1964 112.4 21 38.3 34.1 24
1965 108.6 21 36.4 33.6 24
1966 107.2 21 36.8 34.3 24
1967 103.9 21 40.9 39.3 24
1968 101.1 21 39.3 38.8 24
1969 98.1 21 34.0 34.7 24
1970 89.2 21 41.9 46.9 8
1971 97.3 21 37.1 38.1 8
1972 90.3 21 41.9 23.4 4
1973 88.7 20 4
1974 88.1 20 40.0 45.4 4
1975 93.1 20 43.7 46.9 4
1976 96.6 20 36.6 37.9 4
1977 94.0 20 29.4 31.3 4
1978 87.1 20 29.2 33.6 4
1979 82.7 20 28.9 35.0 4
Note: Column (1) is number of men born in indicated year. Column (2) is legal age of conscrip on. Column (3) is
number of men conscripted into the army in the year the cohort turned 21 (born 1972 or earlier) or 20 (born 1973
or later). Number conscripted excludes a small number of men conscripted into the airforce and navy. Men born
in 1972 and 1973 were both conscripted in 1993, and entry in column (3) is total for both cohorts. Column (4)
representsthera oofcolumn(3)tocolumn(1): forthecohortsbornin1972and1973weassumeequalconscrip on
rates. Column (5) is the maximum length of service. See Data Appendix for sources.Table 2: S       S             S  -G         M    C      B    1967
Early Entrants (Working Full-Time in 1987 or 1988) Not
Complete Conscripted Early
Cohort Total Yes/No Yes No Missing Residual Entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of observa ons 86,909 18,517 6,749 1,838 4,911 9,502 2,266 68,392
Pre-conscrip on:
Share with observed wage
1986 14.1 46.6 51.4 62.1 47.4 39.9 61.0 5.3
1987 16.5 72.3 66.4 77.5 62.3 71.5 93.2 1.4
1988 15.5 68.0 95.0 81.5 100.0 58.9 25.7 1.2
1989 13.2 36.7 72.8 0.0 100.0 0.0 82.9 6.8
Share on leave of absence
1986 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.4 0.4
1987 0.6 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.6 0.6 0.2 0.5
1988 2.1 6.0 5.0 18.5 0.0 3.3 19.8 1.1
1989 3.4 11.8 27.2 100.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 1.2
(Log) real hourly wage
1986 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.58
1987 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78
1988 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.88 0.83
1989 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.90
Schooling:
Share <=4 years at entry 40.8 53.7 53.2 46.4 55.8 53.9 54.5 37.3
Av. at entry into labor market 6.9 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.2 7.3
Av. in 2002 7.1 5.8 5.8 6.0 5.8 5.8 5.7 7.5
Post-conscrip on:
Share with wage obs, 2002-2009 60.9 62.2 72.6 72.4 72.7 52.4 72.0 60.6
(Log) real hourly wage, 2002-09 1.66 1.54 1.55 1.57 1.54 1.55 1.52 1.71
Note: Early entrants are deﬁned as men who were observed working full  me in either 1987 or 1988. Conscripted
menincludemenwhowereworkingfull mein1987,andwereonleaveofabsence(listedontherosterofemployees
withmissingvaluesforwagesandhours)in1988and1989,plusmenwhowereworkingfull mein1988andonleave
in 1989. Non-conscripted men are those who were working full  me in 1988 and 1989. “Missing” group in column
6 are those who were working full  me in 1987 or 1988 and are not present in the QP in 1989. “Residual” group in
column 7 are all men who were working full  me in 1987 or 1988 and are not included as conscripts, non-conscripts,
or missing. Share with wage observa on(s), 2002-2009 refers to the frac on of the group indicated in the column
heading who were observed as wage earners in the QP at least once between 2002 and 2009.Table 3: E         E         C               L      P  -C            W    
All Low-Educa on High-Educa on
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conscrip on Dummy (coeﬃcient×100) 0.17 -0.36 -0.28 -0.28 -1.02 -0.43
(0.68) (0.66) (0.88) (0.88) (1.01) (0.99)
Schooling at Age 20/21 (coef. X 100)
Primary schooling (4 years) -0.20 -0.22
(2.17) (2.00)
Lower intermediate (6 years) 4.45
(2.19)
Intermediate (9 years) 18.18 13.73
(2.36) (1.21)
Secondary (12 years) 21.32 16.86
(2.57) (1.69)
Number of Observa ons 6,749 3,496 3,253
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is log of hourly wage at age 20/21. For conscripts wage is
measured on last job held before service. For nonconscripts wage is measured on job in 1988. Years of completed
schooling are taken from employer report for job that is taken as pre-conscrip on job. Omi ed category is less than
primary schooling. See text for further details.
Table 4: E         W    E          C                 A           M     
OLS, No Control OLS, Controling Diﬀerenced Model: Quasi-Diﬀ. Model:
for Wage at for Wage at Wage Minus Wage Wage - 2.62 Wage
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 at Age 20/21 at Age 20/21
Conscript. Std. Conscript. Std. Conscript. Std. Conscript. Std.
Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a) Overall Sample
Pooled 1991-2000 1.1 (0.9) 0.9 (0.8) 0.6 (0.9) -0.2 (2.0)
Pooled 2002-2009 2.1 (1.2) 2.1 (1.2) 2.0 (1.3) 1.9 (2.3)
b) Low Educa on
Pooled 1991-2000 0.6 (1.2) 0.6 (1.1) 0.7 (1.3) 0.8 (2.7)
Pooled 2002-2009 4.1 (1.7) 4.1 (1.6) 4.3 (1.8) 4.5 (3.2)
c) High Educa on
Pooled 1991-2000 1.5 (1.3) 1.0 (1.2) 0.5 (1.4) -1.1 (2.8)
Pooled 2002-2009 0.5 (1.8) 0.4 (1.7) 0.3 (1.9) -0.1 (3.1)
Notes: Es mated coeﬃcients  mes 100 (with standard errors clustered by person in parenthesis). Pooled es mates
use sample of available person-year observa ons and include dummies for year and for educa on as of age 20 or 21.
Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use as dependent variable
wageatindicatedyear,minuswageatage20/21. Modelsincolumns7-8useasdependentvariablewageatindicated
year minus 2.62  mes wage at age 20/21. Source: Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Table 5: R          C     : E         W    E          C                Y     2002-2009      A    -
       M     
OLS, No Control OLS, Controling Diﬀ. Model: Quasi-Diﬀ. Model:
for Wage at for Wage at Wage Minus Wage Wage - 2.62 Wage
Age 20/21 Age 20/21 at Age 20/21 at Age 20/21
Sample Conscr. Std. Conscr. Std. Conscr. Std. Conscr. Std.
Size Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
a) Overall Sample
1) Baseline 6,749 2.1 (1.2) 2.1 (1.2) 2.0 (1.3) 1.9 (2.3)
2) Relax full- me 7,781 2.5 (1.2) 2.7 (1.1) 2.9 (1.2) 3.6 (2.2)
3) Relax leave in 1989 7,511 2.1 (1.1) 2.8 (1.1) 3.8 (1.2) 6.6 (2.0)
4) Impose full- me 1987 6,281 3.0 (1.4) 2.6 (1.3) 1.9 (1.5) 0.0 (2.5)
5) Adjust 1987 wages 6,749 2.1 (1.2) 1.7 (1.2) 1.2 (1.3) -0.3 (2.3)
b) Low Educa on
1) Baseline 3,496 4.1 (1.7) 4.1 (1.6) 4.3 (1.8) 4.5 (3.2)
2) Relax full- me 4,117 4.1 (1.6) 4.3 (1.5) 4.9 (1.7) 6.1 (3.1)
3) Relax leave in 1989 3,862 3.8 (1.4) 4.6 (1.4) 6.2 (1.5) 10.0 (2.8)
4) Impose full- me 1987 3,283 5.4 (1.9) 5.1 (1.9) 4.5 (2.1) 3.1 (3.7)
5) Adjust 1987 wages 3,496 4.1 (1.7) 3.8 (1.6) 3.3 (1.8) 2.2 (3.2)
c) High Educa on
1) Baseline 3,253 0.5 (1.8) 0.4 (1.7) 0.3 (1.9) -0.1 (3.1)
2) Relax full- me 3,664 1.3 (1.7) 1.4 (1.7) 1.4 (1.8) 1.5 (3.1)
3) Relax leave in 1989 3,649 0.7 (1.6) 1.2 (1.6) 1.9 (1.7) 3.7 (2.8)
4) Impose full- me 1987 2,998 1.2 (1.9) 0.6 (1.9) -0.1 (2.0) -2.2 (3.4)
5) Adjust 1987 wages 3,253 0.5 (1.8) 0.1 (1.7) -0.5 (1.9) -2.2 (3.1)
Notes: In the baseline sample, conscripts include men who were working full  me in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and
1989, plus men who were working full  me in 1988 and on leave in 1989. Non-conscripted men are those who were
working full  me in 1988 and 1989. Sample in rows 2 replaces “full  me” work requirements for both groups with
requirement that the individual be working and have a valid wage. Sample in rows 3 modiﬁes conscript deﬁni on
to include men who were working full  me in 1987 and on leave in 1988, plus men who were working full  me in
1988 and on leave in 1989, thus dropping the requirement that the men who worked full  me in 1987 were also on
leave in 1989. Sample in rows 4 modiﬁes conscript deﬁni on to include men who were working full  me in 1987
and on leave in 1988 and 1989, plus men who were working full  me in both 1987 and 1988 and on leave in 1989,
thus limi ng the second group to those who were working full  me in both 1987 and 1988. Sample in rows 5 is same
as baseline. However, wages of conscripts who were working full  me in 1987 and on leave in 1988 and 1989 are
inﬂatedby4.4%. Es matedcoeﬃcients mes100(withstandarderrorsinparentheses). Allmodelsincludedummies
for year and educa on as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 4-5 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in
columns 6-7 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 8-9 use
as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus 2.62  mes wage at age 20/21. Es mates use sample of available
person-year observa ons. Standard errors are clustered by person. Source: Computa ons based on Portugal, MTSS
(1986-2009).Table 6: C         E        
All Low-Educa on High-Educa on
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conscrip on Dummy 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.26 0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Schooling at Age 20/21:
Less than primary schooling 2.54 1.80
(0.21) (0.2)
Primary schooling (4 years) 0.76
(0.11)
Lower intermediate (6 years) 0.30 0.31
(0.12) (0.1)
Intermediate (9 years) 0.29 0.30
(0.14) (0.12)
Mean 0.77 1.04 0.50
Standard Devia on 1.68 1.86 1.43
Obs. 4,903 2,459 2,444
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes conscripts and nonconscripts who were observed working
as a wage earner in the QP at least once between 2002 and 2009. Dependent variable is change in schooling from
last observed value (in 2002-2009 period) to ini al value at age 20/21. Omi ed category is completed secondary
schooling (12 years). Source: Computa ons based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Figure 1: L     M      S        , C              W       F   -         Y           M        E     -
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Note: For the 1967 cohort (ﬁrst row), military enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 (thus observed
theyearbefore, atage20or19dependingonthedateofbirth)andservicelastedfor24months; forthe1977cohort
(second row), enlistment was due the year the individual turned 20 and service lasted for 4 months; for the 1987
cohort (third row), military enlistment had been abolished and the plot is condi onal on working full- me the year
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Note: Conscripted is an individual working full- me in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the years military
enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full- me during the years military enlistment
is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24
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Note: Conscripted is an individual working full- me in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the years military
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Note: Conscripted is an individual working full- me in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the years military
enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full- me during the years military enlistment
is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24
months. Source: Computa ons based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).Figure 5: E                                      35-42,      -                                     -




































































































































c. high education men


























































































Fraction Conscripted (left scale)
Age-adjusted Mean Cohort Wage (right scale)
Source: Computa ons based on Portugal - MTSS (1986-2009), Baganha and Marques (2001), and Portugal - Estado
Maior do Ex ercito (2000).Appendix
Dataset
Quadros de Pessoal (QP) data are gathered annually by the Portuguese Ministry of
Employment. All rms with wage-earners are required to complete the survey. Civil
servants and household workers are excluded from coverage. The coverage of agriculture
is also relatively low, given its low share of wage-earners. The mandatory nature of the
survey leads to extremely high response rates, and in recent years nearly all rms with
wage-earners in manufacturing and services are included in the data set. Nevertheless,
there was some under-coverage {particularly of very small rms{ in the initial years of
the QP (Portugal, MTSS, 1990).
All personnel working in the rm in a reference week (in March until 1993 and
in October from 1994 onwards) are in-scope for the QP. Workers on short-term leave
(e.g., sickness, maternity leave, vacation, and strikes) and those on leave for compulsory
military service are also supposed to be reported. Appendix Table A.1 claries the
coding of leaves of absence during the period under analysis.
Reported data in the QP include the rm's location, industry, employment, sales,
ownership (private Portuguese-owned, private foreign-owned, or public-owned), incorpo-
ration status, and the worker's gender, age, occupation, schooling, date of hire, monthly
earnings (split into several components), and hours of work. Schooling information per-
tains to the highest completed level of education, with the following categories: rst
cycle or primary education (4 years); second cycle (6 years); third cycle (9 years); high
school (12 years); university.1
Workers are assigned an identication number, based on a transformation of the
social security number, that enables tracking over time. Similarly, each rm entering
the database is assigned a unique identication number and it can be followed over time.
The Ministry implements several checks to ensure that a rm that has already reported
to the database is not assigned a dierent identication number. Most of these routines
are based on the detailed location of the company and its legal identication codes.
Merging data across years
We combine QP data for the period from 1986 to 2009. The following data checks and
selection procedures were implemented to prepare a worker-level data set to be merged
1Since the mid-1990s, these categories, and in particular the two highest categories, are further
subdivided.across years.
Selection of valid worker identication codes: Observations with missing or invalid
worker identication codes have been dropped. This restriction led to dropping an
average 5.5% percent of the observations in the original yearly data sets made available
by the Ministry of Employment.
Handling of duplicate worker identication codes in a given year: Only workers whose
identication number appears at a maximum of two dierent rms are included in the
annual le we use to build a longitudinal le. This allows workers to have a maximum
of two jobs during the reference week. In the case of a duplicate observation in any year,
we also checked that the worker's gender, date of birth, and schooling were the same
in both jobs { otherwise the observations were dropped. On average 0.6 percent of the
original observations in the annual QP les are dropped because the worker appeared
at 3 or more rms; 2.7 percent of the observations were dropped because the worker
appeared at two rms but had dierent gender, age or schooling in the two jobs; and
0.1 percent of the observations were dropped because the worker was reported twice by
the same rm.
After these data checks, on average 91 percent of the observations in the original
yearly data sets are retained, yielding an initial panel of 50,847,109 person-year obser-
vations on 7,963,035 workers.
Checks on the consistency of the longitudinal data
We imputed age and/or schooling to missing observations whenever there was no obvious
inconsistency in the reported values.2 These imputations aected 1.2 percent and 0.9
percent of the observations in the initial panel, respectively for age and schooling.
Inconsistencies were identied if the worker's gender or date of birth was reported
as changing, or if the highest schooling level was reported as decreasing over time. In
such cases, the value reported in over 50% of the non-missing records was treated as the
correct value (if there was such a value). Using this procedure, 0.8 percent, 2.5 percent
and 7.7 percent of the observations in the initial panel were corrected for inconsistencies
in reported gender, birth date and education, respectively. In cases where no value was
reported more than half the time, the individual was dropped from the panel. Overall, 1.5
percent, 0.8 percent and 6.2 percent of the observations are dropped due to inconsistent
2If schooling was consistently reported (possibly increasing over time) and the values it achieved
before and after a missing year were the same, the missing value was corrected; similarly, missings in
the initial/nal period(s) were extrapolated from the earliest/latest reported value.information on gender, birth date or schooling, respectively.
Finally, any remaining workers with missing age or schooling were dropped (0.3
percent and 1.7 percent of the initial panel, respectively).
The nal panel data set includes 45,511,769 person-year observations for 7,159,178
workers: this represents approximately 90 percent of the initial panel.
A nal set of checks on the longitudinal data concentrated on the date of hire infor-
mation. Dates of hire later than the date of the survey reference week were considered as
mistakes and recoded to missing (aecting 3.8% of the observations). Missing informa-
tion on date of hire was imputed whenever it was consistently reported for other years
in the spell (aecting 4.6% of the observations). When the information was reported
inconsistently across years, the date of hire reported more than one-half the time was
taken as the correct one, leading to corrections for 2.1% of the observations. If after these
corrections a worker had two or more dates of hire within the same employment spell the
rst reported date was considered the correct date (correcting 0.9% of the observations).
Workers with inconsistent data after the introduction of the previous corrections were
assigned missing information on date of hire (0.1% of the observations).
Sources of Information on Military Service
In the text and tables we present information on various aspects of military service. Our
primary sources for this information are as follows:
On regulations governing military service:
 Portugal. Assembleia da Rep ublica (1987). Law 30/87, July 7.
 Portugal. Assembleia da Rep ublica (1991). Law 22/91, June 19.
 Portugal. Minist erio da Defesa Nacional (1988). Decree-law 463/88, December 15.
 Portugal. Presid^ encia da Rep ublica (1968). Law 2135, July 11.
On the recording of men in military service in the QP:
 Portugal. Minist erio do Trabalho (1980). Decree-law 380/80, September 17.Estimation of Covariance Model for Wage Residuals
In this appendix we discuss our methods for estimating the parameters  t. The reduced
form wage residuals for individual i in period t are assumed to be generated by the model:
vit =  ti + it t = 0;1;:::T
with  0 = 1: Under this model the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals has
elements:
var[vit] = ( t)22
 + var[it]
cov[vit;vis] =  t s2
 + cov[it;is];
where 2
 = var[i] is the variance of the permanent ability component. We assume that
the transitory shocks t are generated by a stationary rst-order autoregressive process:




and an arbitrary value for the variance of i0 :
var[i0] = 2
0:
To allow for additional potential non-stationarity at the start of the work-life, we also
assume that the pre-conscription wage residual contains an additive component:
vi0 = i + i0 + i0;
where var[i0] = 2
; and i0 is uncorrelated with i or the sequence of transitory shocks.
Finally we assume that  t rises linearly for t = 14 years, and thereafter remains constant:
 t = 1 + gt 0  t  14
=   = 1 + gt t > 14:
Under these assumptions the 190 elements of the 19  19 variance covariance matrix of
the wage residuals for the pre-conscription wage w0 and the post-conscription wages in
1991-2000 plus 2002-2009 can be written as a function of underlying parameter vector




;g: Lettingb mist = b vitb vis
represent the product of the estimated reduced form errors for individual i in periods s







where Nst is the number of observations with observed wages in periods s and t: Let b m
= vec[ b mst]: Our model assumes that in the absence of sampling error the elements of m
will depend on the parameters  :
m = f():
We choose  to minimize the sum of squared residuals [ b m f()]0[ b m f()]; and use stan-
dard formulas to construct a matrix of sampling errors for the corresponding estimate.
Our estimates (and standard errors) are as follows










We used these parameters to simulate wage data for a set of 6700 people over the
same horizon as our sample (i.e., for the initial wage observation, and for the post-
conscription period from 1991 to 2009) and assumed that 28% of the data were missing
at random in each year from 2002-2009. We then divided the sample into 100 percentile
groups based on the initial (pre-conscription) wage, and constructed an average wages
over the 2002-2009 period for each percentile group. Finally, we regressed the mean
2002-2009 wage for each percentile group on their average pre-conscription wage and
obtained a regression coecient of 0:54 with R2 = 0:88: This compares to the actual
data in Figure 2 which yields a regression coecient of 0:53 and R2 = 0:77:T     A.1: T                                                               
Type of Worker QP Coding of Coding of Notes











=1 Wage paid (approx. 65% of normal wage)
by the social security, a er 3 days of sick-
ness. Es matedoverallrateofsicknessab-
senteeism in Portugal: 8% (EFILWC, 1997,
p. 18).
Maternity yes missing missing =1 MaternityleavestartedinPortugalin1976,
when it lasted for 90 days. Currently, it
lasts for 120 days.
Strike yes missing missing =1 Average of 0.016% work days lost per
yearduring1986-1996(owncomputa ons
based on Portugal, INE (2011) and Pordata
(2011)).
Holiday yes reported reported =0
Military yes missing missing =1
Note: (1) Instruc ons to ﬁll out the ques onnaire during the 1980s and 1990s stated that everyone engaged in the
ﬁrm during the reference period should be listed, including: "the owner of the ﬁrm, if performing a func on in the
ﬁrm; unpaid and paid family members, if working in the ﬁrm more than one third of the normal dura on of work;
piece-rate workers; workers on short-term leave and those doing their military service" (Portugal, MT, Decree-Law
380/80, instruc ons on ﬁlling out column 2 of the Quadros de Pessoal form) [own transla on]. Elsewhere in the
instruc ons form, examples of short term leave are provided: sickness, maternity, holiday, strike.T     A2. : E         W    E          C               V       A         A           M      (P      E         G     )
OLS Model with No OLS Model Including Diﬀerenced Model: Quasi-Diﬀerenced Model:
Control for Wage at Control for Wage at Wage Minus Wage at Wage Minus 2.62 x Wage at
Modal Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21
Year Age Conscrip on Std. Conscrip on Std. Conscrip on Std. Conscrip on Std.
Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1991 24 -1.4 (1.1) -1.8 (1.0) -2.1 (1.1) -3.1 (2.0)
1992 25 1.7 (1.2) 1.4 (1.1) 1.0 (1.2) 0.0 (2.1)
1993 26 1.5 (1.3) 1.4 (1.2) 1.3 (1.3) 1.1 (2.3)
1994 27 1.2 (1.4) 1.1 (1.3) 0.9 (1.4) 0.5 (2.4)
1995 28 1.8 (1.3) 1.5 (1.2) 1.1 (1.3) 0.0 (2.3)
1996 29 2.6 (1.4) 2.2 (1.4) 1.7 (1.5) 0.3 (2.5)
1997 30 0.6 (1.3) 0.6 (1.3) 0.6 (1.4) 0.6 (2.4)
1998 31 1.4 (1.3) 1.0 (1.2) 0.5 (1.4) -0.8 (2.4)
1999 32 0.9 (1.3) 0.6 (1.2) 0.1 (1.3) -1.1 (2.3)
2000 33 1.2 (1.3) 1.2 (1.3) 1.0 (1.4) 0.7 (2.3)
2002 35 0.8 (1.4) 0.9 (1.4) 0.9 (1.5) 1.0 (2.4)
2003 36 2.2 (1.4) 2.3 (1.4) 2.4 (1.5) 2.8 (2.5)
2004 37 0.4 (1.4) 0.6 (1.4) 0.9 (1.5) 1.7 (2.5)
2005 38 2.2 (1.4) 2.1 (1.4) 2.0 (1.5) 1.6 (2.4)
2006 39 3.0 (1.5) 2.8 (1.4) 2.6 (1.5) 1.8 (2.4)
2007 40 3.7 (1.5) 3.5 (1.4) 3.1 (1.5) 2.2 (2.4)
2008 41 2.5 (1.4) 2.4 (1.4) 2.2 (1.5) 1.8 (2.5)
2009 42 1.7 (1.5) 1.8 (1.5) 2.1 (1.6) 2.7 (2.5)
Pooled 1991-2000 1.1 (0.9) 0.9 (0.8) 0.6 (0.9) -0.2 (2.0)
Pooled 2002-2009 2.1 (1.2) 2.1 (1.2) 2.0 (1.3) 1.9 (2.3)
Notes: Es matedcoeﬃcients mes 100 (with standarderrorsin parentheses) frommodels ﬁt separatelybyagetowagesof conscriptsand non-conscripts.
All models include dummies for educa on as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use
as dependent variable wage at indicated age, minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus
2.62  mes wage at age 20/21. Pooled es mates use sample of available person-year observa ons, and include year dummies. Standard errors for pooled
models are clustered by person. Source: Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).T     A2. : E         W    E          C               V       A         A           M          L  -E         M  
OLS Model with No OLS Model Including Diﬀerenced Model: Quasi-Diﬀerenced Model:
Control for Wage at Control for Wage at Wage Minus Wage at Wage Minus 2.62 x Wage at
Modal Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21
Year Age Conscrip on Std. Conscrip on Std. Conscrip on Std. Conscrip on Std.
Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1991 24 -1.4 (1.5) -1.7 (1.4) -1.9 (1.5) -2.8 (2.8)
1992 25 -0.8 (1.5) -1.0 (1.5) -1.4 (1.6) -2.3 (3.0)
1993 26 0.1 (1.8) 0.7 (1.7) 1.0 (1.8) 2.0 (3.1)
1994 27 0.9 (1.9) 0.9 (1.8) 0.9 (1.9) 0.7 (3.3)
1995 28 1.0 (1.7) 1.1 (1.6) 1.2 (1.8) 1.6 (3.2)
1996 29 3.1 (2.0) 2.8 (1.9) 2.7 (2.1) 2.0 (3.4)
1997 30 -0.7 (1.8) -0.6 (1.7) -0.5 (1.9) -0.1 (3.2)
1998 31 0.5 (1.7) 0.7 (1.6) 1.2 (1.8) 2.4 (3.2)
1999 32 2.0 (1.7) 2.1 (1.6) 2.3 (1.8) 2.8 (3.2)
2000 33 1.7 (1.7) 1.9 (1.6) 2.1 (1.8) 2.6 (3.1)
2002 35 2.9 (1.8) 3.1 (1.8) 3.4 (1.9) 4.1 (3.3)
2003 36 4.2 (1.9) 4.6 (1.8) 5.5 (2.0) 7.5 (3.4)
2004 37 2.3 (1.8) 2.6 (1.8) 3.3 (2.0) 5.0 (3.4)
2005 38 3.6 (1.9) 3.6 (1.8) 3.6 (2.0) 3.5 (3.4)
2006 39 4.1 (1.8) 3.9 (1.8) 3.4 (2.0) 2.4 (3.4)
2007 40 5.0 (1.9) 4.9 (1.8) 4.8 (2.0) 4.4 (3.4)
2008 41 5.5 (1.8) 5.4 (1.8) 5.2 (2.0) 4.7 (3.4)
2009 42 4.8 (1.8) 4.8 (1.8) 4.9 (2.0) 5.0 (3.5)
Pooled 1991-2000 0.6 (1.2) 0.6 (1.1) 0.7 (1.3) 0.8 (2.7)
Pooled 2002-2009 4.1 (1.7) 4.1 (1.6) 4.3 (1.8) 4.5 (3.2)
Notes: Es matedcoeﬃcients mes 100 (with standarderrorsin parentheses) frommodels ﬁt separatelybyagetowagesof conscriptsand non-conscripts.
All models include dummies for educa on as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use
as dependent variable wage at indicated age, minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus
2.62  mes wage at age 20/21. Pooled es mates use sample of available person-year observa ons, and include year dummies. Standard errors for pooled
models are clustered by person. Source: Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).T     A2. : E         W    E          C               V       A         A           M          H   -E         M  
OLS Model with No OLS Model Including Diﬀerenced Model: Quasi-Diﬀerenced Model:
Control for Wage at Control for Wage at Wage Minus Wage at Wage Minus 2.62 x Wage at
Modal Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21 Age 20/21
Year Age Conscrip on Std. Conscrip on Std. Conscrip on Std. Conscrip on Std.
Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error Eﬀect Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1991 24 -1.4 (1.6) -1.8 (1.4) -2.2 (1.5) -3.4 (2.9)
1992 25 3.7 (1.8) 3.4 (1.7) 3.0 (1.8) 1.8 (3.2)
1993 26 2.3 (1.9) 2.0 (1.8) 1.6 (2.0) 0.3 (3.4)
1994 27 1.5 (1.9) 1.2 (2.0) 1.0 (2.1) 0.2 (3.5)
1995 28 2.5 (1.9) 1.8 (1.8) 1.0 (1.9) -1.5 (3.4)
1996 29 2.2 (2.0) 1.6 (1.9) 1.0 (2.1) -1.1 (3.5)
1997 30 1.7 (2.0) 1.6 (1.9) 1.5 (2.0) 1.2 (3.5)
1998 31 2.0 (1.9) 1.1 (1.9) 0.0 (2.0) -3.3 (3.4)
1999 32 -0.1 (1.9) -0.7 (1.8) -1.6 (2.0) -4.1 (3.4)
2000 33 0.9 (1.9) 0.6 (1.9) 0.3 (2.0) -0.7 (3.4)
2002 35 -0.8 (2.1) -1.0 (2.0) -1.1 (2.2) -1.5 (3.5)
2003 36 0.5 (2.1) 0.3 (2.0) 0.0 (2.2) -0.9 (3.7)
2004 37 -1.0 (2.2) -1.0 (2.1) -1.0 (2.3) -0.9 (3.6)
2005 38 1.1 (2.1) 1.0 (2.1) 0.8 (2.2) 0.2 (3.5)
2006 39 2.2 (2.2) 2.0 (2.1) 1.9 (2.2) 1.4 (3.5)
2007 40 2.7 (2.2) 2.3 (2.1) 1.8 (2.2) 0.5 (3.5)
2008 41 0.2 (2.2) 0.1 (2.1) -0.1 (2.3) -0.4 (3.6)
2009 42 -0.6 (2.3) -0.4 (2.2) 0.0 (2.3) 1.0 (3.6)
Pooled 1991-2000 1.5 (1.3) 1.0 (1.2) 0.5 (1.4) -1.1 (2.8)
Pooled 2002-2009 0.5 (1.8) 0.4 (1.7) 0.3 (1.9) -0.1 (3.1)
Notes: Es matedcoeﬃcients mes 100 (with standarderrorsin parentheses) frommodels ﬁt separatelybyagetowagesof conscriptsand non-conscripts.
All models include dummies for educa on as of age 20 or 21. Models in columns 3-4 include wage measured at age 20 or 21. Models in columns 5-6 use
as dependent variable wage at indicated age, minus wage at age 20/21. Models in columns 7-8 use as dependent variable wage at indicated age minus
2.62  mes wage at age 20/21. Pooled es mates use sample of available person-year observa ons, and include year dummies. Standard errors for pooled














































































































































Note: 'Conscripted' is an individual working full- me in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the years military
enlistment is due; 'non-conscripted' is an individual observed working full- me during the years military enlistment
is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24






































































Note: 'Conscripted' is an individual working full- me in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the years military
enlistment is due; 'non-conscripted' is an individual observed working full- me during the years military enlistment
is due. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24

















































































































































Note: Conscripted is an individual working full- me in 1987 or 1988 and reported on leave during the years military
enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full- me during the years military enlistment
would have been due; 'missing' is an individual not observed employed in the private sector during the years military
conscrip on was due; the 'residual' category combines all other combina ons of labor market situa ons from 1987
to 1989. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the individual turned 21 and it lasted for 24









































































Note: Conscripted is an individual working full- me the year before military enlistment is due, and reported on leave
during the years military enlistment is due; non-conscripted is an individual observed working full- me during the
yearsmilitary enlistmentwouldhavebeen due; 'missing' isan individualnot observedemployedinthe privatesector
duringtheyearsmilitaryconscrip onwasdue;the'residual'categorycombinesallothercombina onsoflabormarket
situa ons from 1987 to 1989. For the cohort born 1967, military enlistment was due the year the individual turned
21 and it lasted for 24 months. Source: Computa ons based on Portugal, MTSS (1986-2009).